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CORPORATE BOARDS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN AN 
ENVIRONMENT OF SEVERE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the relationship between board and ownership structures and firm 
performance in an environment of severe political and economic crisis. Using panel data from the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) for the period 2000-2005, we split the period into pre-
presidential election period (2000-2002) (a relatively stable political and economic period) and 
post-presidential election period (2003-2005) (a hostile political and economic period) to capture 
the differences in the political and economic landscape. We find that board size, ownership 
concentration and executive directors’ share ownership increased whilst the proportion of non-
executive directors reduced in the post-presidential election period. Employing a system 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach, we find that performance is positively related 
to board size and ownership concentration in the post- (but not in the pre-) presidential election 
period. The results also show that performance is negatively related to executive directors’ share 
ownership in the post-presidential election period, but positively related in the pre-presidential 
election period. The proportion of non-executive directors is negative and significant in both 
periods. These findings support the notion that the effects of board and ownership structures 
depend on the nature of the firm’s environment, and therefore have important implications for 
policy-makers. 
Keywords: Corporate governance structures; firm performance; political and economic crisis; rule 
of law and enforcement, political theory. 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, there has been extensive research devoted to firm-level corporate governance 
in different countries. In this respect, studies have examined the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and organisational outcomes such as firm performance (e.g., Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Coles et al., 2008), management 
earnings forecasts (e.g., Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005) and earnings 
management (e.g., Peasnell et al., 2005). Collectively, these studies show that corporate 
governance mechanisms are important for organisational outcomes. However, the studies have 
mostly examined ‘the stable or growing firm—that is, the focus is on effectively managing the 
successful organisation’ (Daily et al., 2003, p. 377) and most importantly, the focus has been on 
managing firm performance in stable operating environments. Relatively little research has 
examined managing firm performance in a crisis environment, financial or otherwise (Daily et al., 
2003). The exceptions are those studies that have investigated corporate governance effects on 
performance in (1) weak legal environments (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Dahya et al., 2008), (2) financial crisis (e.g., Mitton, 2002; Joh, 2003; 
Baek et al., 2004) and (3) financially distressed firms (e.g., Daily and Dalton, 1994) or firms 
subject to stock exchange listing suspension (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). Nonetheless, these 
studies were all conducted in environments in which the political and economic environment was 
stable and the legal systems were functional. 
In this study, we add to the literature by examining the relationship between corporate board 
and ownership structures (board size, non-executive directors, executive directors’ share ownership 
and ownership concentration) and firm performance in an environment of severe political and 
economic crisis, and where the rule of law is not functional. To our knowledge, no study has 
examined corporate governance effects in an environment of severe political and economic crisis. 
A political and economic crisis, coupled with a dysfunctional legal system, creates high levels of 
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uncertainty and can significantly impact on firm performance (Pearson and Clair, 1998) or even 
threaten the firm’s survival (Mitroff et al., 1988). In such an environment, the managerial agency 
costs are expected to increase---managers are provided with the ability and incentive to expropriate 
wealth (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; Klapper and Love, 2004; Berglof and Claessens, 2006). This is 
because constraints on managers’ ability to expropriate wealth are absent (Roe, 2003; Gourevitch, 
2003) and since the legal systems are dysfunctional, effective prosecution may be minimal.1 In this 
context, corporate governance becomes the only credible mechanism to protect shareholders and 
may substitute for the broken down legal systems in dealing with the agency problems (La Porta et 
al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2002; Klapper and Love, 2004). However, the set of corporate governance 
structures that are required for effective monitoring may differ from those in stable operating 
environments because the nature and size of agency costs are different. This implies that the 
conventional corporate governance model might not be appropriate in dealing with the agency-
related problems.2 
Our argument draws from the political theory (Roe, 2003; Gourevitch, 2003; Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005) which argues that the political and social context in a country determines the size of 
managerial agency costs that shareholders have to bear. Roe (2003) argues that the political and 
social environment in a country determines the legal system and the quality of the legal system 
determines shareholders’ rights and how those rights are protected. The quality of the legal system 
argument is similar to La Porta et al. (1998), but Roe (2003) argues that where there is political and 
social instability, the effectiveness of the law in protecting shareholders is diminished leading to 
increasing agency costs. Faced with this problem, Roe (2003) suggests that shareholders will 
reshape the firm’s corporate governance structures in order to ward off any threats resulting from 
the political and economic instability. For example, they may be inclined to increase share 
ownership concentration (Roe, 2003) or to increase the size of the board (Dalton et al., 1999; 
1
 In normal operating environments, even when the legal systems are weak, shareholders have some protection via the law. 
2
 We use the phrase ‘conventional corporate governance structures’ to refer to the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, 
which generally recommends (1) boards that are composed of majority non-executive directors; (2) diffuse share ownership; and (3) 
managerial ownership. 
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Adams and Ferreira, 2007) to enhance the quality of monitoring. In line with this, the organisation 
science literature (Scott, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2008) suggests that different corporate governance 
structures are more or less effective depending on the context of the different organisational 
environments. Recent empirical studies on the determinants of board structure have also shown that 
firms structure their boards in response to the complexity of the firm (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Linck et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008). In this case, firm complexity has been defined in terms of 
firm size, scope of operations or the extent of reliance on external funding (Klein, 1998; Coles et 
al., 2008). In this study, we view the political and economic crisis, with a dysfunctional legal 
system, as another dimension of complexity for which shareholders may need to deploy a different 
set of corporate governance mechanisms that they consider appropriate in responding to the 
resulting agency problems and improve firm performance. 
We use panel data drawn from annual reports published by the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
(ZSE) listed firms over a six-year period from 2000 to 2005, inclusive. Zimbabwe, as a country, 
provides a unique setting in which to investigate the issues raised for three reasons. First, in the 
study period, the country was embroiled in a political and economic crisis and was widely 
considered an archetypal example of a country whose rule of law and its enforcement had broken 
down. The political and economic landscape that began in 1997, led to a disregard of property 
rights by the government and the breakdown of the legal system (US Department of State, 2005). 
Second, we are able to split the study period into two distinct periods: the pre- and post-presidential 
election periods, thus enabling us to capture the changing political and economic landscape. The 
pre-presidential election period (for our data 2000-2002) was considered a relatively stable political 
and economic environment, whilst the post-presidential election period (2003-2005) became a 
hostile political and economic environment, making it extremely difficult for firms to operate. This 
distinction allows us to explore the effects of corporate governance structures on performance in 
both a stable and hostile political and economic environment. Third, Zimbabwe adopted the UK 
Cadbury Report (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007), thus providing us with the opportunity to 
3 
examine whether the conventional corporate governance model is effective in an environment of 
political and economic crisis.3 Roe (2003) suggests that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
structures is affected by the political and social conditions in a country. Indeed as Okeahalam 
(2004) notes in the context of Africa, corruption is rife and politics often meddles in corporate 
affairs. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) also argue that conventional corporate governance structures 
may be irrelevant to developing countries because the stage of economic and market development 
is low and institutions are weak. 
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, our study is the first to apply the 
political theory (Roe, 2003; Gourevitch, 2003) (La Porta et al., 1998) in examining the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. Consistent with this theory, we find that 
board size, ownership concentration and executive directors’ share ownership increased, whilst the 
proportion of non-executive directors reduced in the post-presidential election period. We interpret 
these changes as an attempt by firms to reshape corporate boards and ownership structures in order 
to cope effectively with the threats posed by the worsening political and economic crisis. The 
results reveal a positive relationship between performance and board size and ownership 
concentration in the post- (but not pre-) presidential election period, suggesting that performance 
increased with board size and ownership concentration. Second, we contribute to recent studies 
(e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Linck et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008) suggesting that firms 
operating in complex environments require larger boards. Our results suggesting that board size is 
positively related to performance in a severe political and economic crisis add to these studies. 
Third, we provide the first evidence of the role corporate governance plays in managing firm 
performance in an environment of severe political and economic crisis with dysfunctional legal 
systems. Thus, we contribute to the literature on (1) legal systems and corporate governance 
efficacy (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Klapper and Love, 2004) and (2) effectiveness of corporate 
governance structures in crisis situations (e.g., Daily and Dalton, 1994; Mitton, 2002; Baek et al., 
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 Mangena and Tauringana (2007) show that compliance with the Cadbury recommendations by ZSE listed firms is 
very high. 
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2004). Finally, we offer evidence on corporate governance and performance in an African context, 
where very little is known about the effects of corporate governance structures in managing firm 
performance (see Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We discuss in Section 2, the institutional 
environment under which the study is conducted. In Section 3, we discuss the theory and develop 
the hypotheses, and explain the research design in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the results of 
the analysis. Finally, in Section 6, we present a summary and conclusions. 
2. Institutional environment in Zimbabwe 
2.1 Political and economic environment in Zimbabwe 
The political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, which began in 1997, can be seen in two 
phases. The first phase, which covers the period 1997 to 2002, can be considered relatively stable 
compared to the second phase (post-2002 period), which saw the deepening of the political and 
economic crisis.4 In the first phase, the liberation war veterans (war vets) put considerable pressure 
on the government to compensate them for their war-time sacrifices to which the government 
acceded in 1997 and made an unbudgeted payment of about Z$4 billion (Chitiyo, 2000The Herald, 
17 September, 1997). Further, in 1998, the government engaged in a costly war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which, by 2000 had cost the country about US$200 million. These two events 
put a strain on the foreign exchange reserves and added significantly to the fiscal deficit (Addison 
and Laakso, 2003). As a result, in 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank suspended balance of payments support to the country. Consequently, the government turned 
to excessive use of bank finance, fuelling money supply growth and an upsurge in inflation. 
Inflation increased from 55.7% in 2000 to 134.6% in 2002 (World Bank, 2007; IMF, 2008). 
Also in 2000, the government initiated a politically motivated fast-track land reform 
programme to redistribute land from white to black farmers. This caused disruption in agricultural 
4
 The crisis started easing from 2009 following the signing of the Global Political Agreement and the formation of a power-sharing 
government by the main political parties. 
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production and a decline in export earnings.5 Agricultural exports declined from US$855.8 million 
in 2000 to US$832.2 million in 2002 (IMF, 2008). Additionally, the country was isolated by most 
of the developed countries following a breakdown of the rule of law (Robertson, 2003). The 
politically motivated land redistribution process was conducted, in the main, without adequately 
compensating the white farmers, and as such was viewed as a disregard of property rights (U.S. 
Department of State, 2005). Although the environment was difficult, firms could operate relatively 
normal and there was general belief in the country that the environment would change for the better 
after the presidential election in 2002. 
On the contrary, the crisis deepened following the violent and disputed presidential elections 
and uncertainty became gloomy. The breakdown of the rule of law escalated after the presidential 
elections in 2002. For example, the war vets extorted money from many firms with no action being 
taken by the law enforcement agencies, including the courts (Kriger, 2003; Goredema, 2003). 
Between March and April 2002, war vets demanded unlawful payments from a number of firms 
without falling foul of the law.6 Zimbabwe was further isolated from the international community 
and this affected firm operations (OECD, 2004). The economic situation deteriorated. Whilst real 
GDP shrunk by 4.5%, 2.6% and 4.4% in 2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively (average of 3.8%), in 
2003, the real GDP growth fell by 10.4% (IMF, 2008) and by 5.8% and 6.5% in 2004 and 2005 
respectively (World Bank, 2007) (an average of 7.7%). The uncertainty over the land redistribution 
programme also increased as further farms were listed for acquisition. Consequently, agricultural 
production declined further and agricultural exports fell from the US$832.8 million in 2002 to 
US$516 million in 2003 (IMF, 2008). Another manifestation of the economic crisis during the 
post-presidential election period was a dramatic increase in inflation from a yearly average of 
134.6% in 2002 to 384.7% in 2003 (IMF, 2008). Although it subsequently dropped to a yearly 
average of 381.4% and 266.8% in 2004 and 2005, respectively (IMF, 2008), inflation remained 
5
 Although the Zimbabwean economy is well diversified, the agricultural sector has traditionally been the mainstay of the economy, 
accounting for approximately 40% of total exports (Robertson, 2003). 
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 For example, Mechman Engineering was forced to pay out Z$7m to 30 former workers. Other companies included Resource 
Drilling, Lobels Bakery, Macmed, Phillips Electric, and Scotco (The Independent, Thursday, 26 April 2002). Goredema (2003) 
reports that although 99% of these cases were reported to law enforcement agencies, only 8% were acted on. 
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significantly higher in the post-presidential election period. These inflationary pressures, coupled 
with an overvalued exchange rate, led to a dramatic increase in production costs and reduced 
export competitiveness and therefore acute shortages of foreign currency (OECD, 2004).7 The 
foreign currency problems resulted in shortages of raw materials and fuels. In 2004, the 
government reintroduced exchange controls (removed in 1994) and exporting firms were required 
to surrender their export proceeds to the central bank at the overvalued official exchange rate. A 
system of foreign currency allocation was introduced by the central bank, but failed to provide 
enough foreign currency to meet firms’ requirements. Hence, firms resorted to the expensive 
‘parallel market’ for foreign currency to buy inputs, thus affecting their profitability. 
In 2004, the shortage of foreign currency became too politicised. The central bank, working 
with the government, accused some directors (or managers) of externalising foreign currency. 
Consequently, some were arrested, and in certain cases, lost their shareholdings to the government. 
For example, Econet Wireless had its directors arrested for purportedly externalising US$1.3 
million. Mutumwa Mawere, a director and major shareholder in SMM Holdings had all his firms 
taken over by the government, again for purportedly externalising foreign currency (see Financial 
Gazette, 6 July 2004). With this operating environment, the ability and incentives by managers to 
expropriate firm resources may increase (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Joh, 2003). In this case, we 
therefore contend that corporate governance is more critical in this environment to help curtail 
expropriation, deal with the problems and enhance firm performance. 
2.2 Corporate governance and ownership structure 
Corporate governance in Zimbabwe was first promoted by the Institute of Directors of Zimbabwe 
(IODZ) in the late 1990s. The efforts of the IODZ culminated in the publication in 2001 of the 
‘Principles for Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: Manual of Best Practice’ which recommended 
the adoption of the UK Cadbury Report. The ZSE amended its listing rules in 2002 and included a 
7
 In March 2003, the official exchange rate was set at Z$824 for one US$, which was well below the black market rate estimated at 
Z$5,000 (OECD, 2004). 
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provision that requires firms to indicate in their annual reports the extent to which they comply 
with the Cadbury Report. Compliance has been widespread, especially on board issues (see 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). For example, the roles of the board chairman and chief executive 
officer (CEO) are separate, non-executive directors represent about 70% of boards and audit 
committees exist (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). 
In terms of ownership structure, the World Bank (2003) suggests that share ownership in 
Zimbabwean firms is concentrated. Mangena and Tauringana (2007) document share ownership of 
about 84% by the top-ten shareholders, of which approximately 45% was held by institutional 
investors and 39% by non-institutional shareholders. Ownership by managers is about 6% (World 
Bank, 2003; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007), which is very low compared to some countries (see 
Mitton, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
3. Theory and hypotheses development 
A majority of studies linking corporate governance structures to firm performance have drawn 
from the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) which posits that the 
separation of ownership and control results in managerial agency costs. Shareholders may deploy a 
range of corporate governance mechanisms (including board and ownership structures) to help 
reduce agency costs and improve performance (Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2010). In this study, 
applying a purely agency theory perspective may not be informative because it cannot capture 
effectively the political context in which the study is conducted. Accordingly, in developing our 
hypotheses, we integrate views from the agency theory with those from the political theory of 
corporate governance (Roe, 2003; Gourevitch, 2003). 
The political theory (Roe, 2003; Gourevitch, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2005) argues that 
the political and social environment in a country affect the firm in important ways. It determines 
how the government affects the firm and the means by which the firm reacts to the political and 
social pressures to protect investors. The political and social environment defines the law, which 
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according to La Porta et al. (1998) determines the rights of investors as well as how well the rights 
are protected. When the legal system is strong, the level of agency problems is expected to be 
lower because ‘active and well-functioning courts can step in and rescue investors from abuse by 
management’ (La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1140). La Porta et al. (1998) and Berglof and Claessens 
(2006) argue that when the legal system is not functional, effective corporate governance 
arrangements could substitute for the weak legal systems in constraining the ability of managers to 
abuse or expropriate shareholders’ wealth. 
Accepting the importance of the legal system, proponents of the political theory argue that 
the legal system ‘can matter...when politics enables it to matter--that is when property rights are 
assured, when enforcement and independent judges are allowed to work, and when the political 
balance in society gives it a place’ (Gourevitch, 2003, p. 1831). In this context, the nature of the 
managerial agency costs depends on the political and social pressures in a country. To this extent, 
the firm will react defensively to political and social pressures by reshaping its ownership and 
corporate governance structures in ways considered appropriate to ward off the political and social 
threats, improve monitoring and firm performance. For example, firms may increase board size 
(Dalton et al., 1999; Adams and Ferreira, 2007) or increase ownership concentration (Roe, 2003). 
3.1 Corporate boards and firm performance 
The role of corporate boards has been examined extensively in the literature. Generally, the 
argument is that smaller boards are more effective because they are (1) more cohesive and faster in 
making decisions (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998), (2) candid in 
discussions of managerial performance (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) and, (3) easier to 
coordinate, but difficult to manipulate by the CEO (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The empirical 
evidence supports this argument, for example, Yermack (1996), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and 
Dahya et al. (2008) document a negative relation between board size and performance. However, 
the environment in Zimbabwe, especially after the presidential elections, might call for larger 
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boards to help cope with the threats of the severe political and economic crisis. In this context, 
firms may expand their boards, for example, by appointing directors with political connections. 
Political connections are a valuable resource for firms (Claessens et al., 2008). Politically 
connected firms could (1) get preferential access to scarce critical resources such as fuels and 
foreign currency and (2) ward off the threats of the political environment (Roe, 2003) such as 
extortion by war vets. Further, larger boards may bring more experience, knowledge and support 
on which the CEO can draw quality advice (Dalton et al., 1999; Adams and Ferreira, 2007) to 
handle the problems relating to the political and economic crisis. As Linck et al. (2008) and Coles 
et al. (2008) suggest, firms in complex environments require larger boards because they have 
greater advisory needs. Hence they may increase the variety of perspectives and skills available, 
foster synergistic contributions and facilitate wider and important linkages (e.g., Pearson and Clair, 
1998; Dalton et al., 1999) that can improve performance in an extremely difficult environment. 
Several studies have argued that non-executive directors (NEDs) can help to enhance value 
by protecting shareholder interests against managerial opportunism (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Weir et al., 2002; Dahya et al., 2008). Empirically, the relation between performance and NEDs is 
not well established. Some studies find a negative relationship (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Coles et al., 2008), others (e.g., Klein, 1998; Ho and Williams, 2003; Ramdani and 
van Witteloostuijn, 2010) find a positive relation and yet some find no relation (e.g., Weir et al., 
2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Conventionally, in Zimbabwe, NEDs could play a more 
important role in the post presidential election period. The unfriendly political and economic 
environment provides opportunities for managers to expropriate wealth given that the legal system 
is unable to prosecute effectively. For example, the threat of extortion by war vets and the fear of 
persecution by the governments could incentivise managers to expropriate. Hence we suggest, as 
do La Porta et al. (1998), that NEDs are the only credible protection available to shareholders 
against expropriation by managers. In this case, shareholders may reshape corporate boards by 
demanding more NEDs on the board to improve monitoring and to expand the advisory support for 
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the CEO (Coles et al., 2008) as well as to help deal with the political threats (Roe, 2003; 
Gourevitch, 2003). Hence we hypothesise the following: 
H1: Firm performance increases with board size. 
H2: Firm performance increases with the proportion of non-executive directors. 
3.2 Ownership structure and firm performance 
Filatotchev and Nakajima (2010) argue that ownership structure is an important corporate governance 
dimension that has profound effect on performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that share 
ownership by managers (or executive directors) helps to alleviate conflict of interests between 
managers and other shareholders. When managers own shares, they are more likely to take decisions 
consistent with wealth-maximisation, and as Hill and Snell (1988) point out, the share-based 
compensation schemes are attempts to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. 
Empirically, the evidence suggests share ownership by managers is beneficial to the firm (e.g., Short 
and Keasey, 1999; Perrini et al., 2008). Whilst the literature suggests that managerial share ownership 
is beneficial in a stable environment, we predict a negative relationship between managerial ownership 
and performance in the post-presidential election period. We take the view that because of the 
persecution of managers and confiscation of their investments by the politician (see Sub-section 2.1), 
managers with higher share ownership are likely to suffer greater losses than those with lower 
ownership in the event that their investments are confiscated. In this context, they might expropriate 
firm assets, for example by externalisation of assets, to reduce their losses. 
In addition to managerial ownership, it is also argued that ownership concentration, on the one 
hand, may cause the controlling shareholders to be entrenched and optimise private benefits rather 
than shareholder value. For example, the controlling shareholders are able to determine the profit 
distribution and may sometimes deprive minority shareholders of their rights to share profits, via, 
for example, related party transactions (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; Dahya et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Claessens et al. (2002) argue that controlling shareholders have 
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incentives and ability to monitor managers in order to protect their investments against expropriation. 
In line with this, Hoskisson et al.’s (2002) review of the literature shows that controlling shareholders 
have the ability to monitor managers and the influence to promote change beneficial to the firm. The 
monitoring role of controlling shareholders is particularly important in a crisis environment because 
the managerial agency costs are expected to be greater (Roe, 2003). La Porta et al. (1998) also argue 
that ownership concentration could substitute for a lack of legal protection in minimising 
expropriation by managers. In this context, ownership concentration may be an effective mechanism 
to resolve the agency problems brought about by the severe political and economic environment and 
improve performance. Some of the controlling shareholders may also have stronger political 
connections which are valuable.8 Hence, we hypothesise the following: 
H3: Firm performance decreases with executive directors’ share ownership. 
H4: Firm performance increases with concentrated share ownership. 
3.3 Control variables 
We also include additional variables to control for other potential factors that may affect firm 
performance. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) suggest that firm size may be related to firm performance. 
Large firms have the financial resources to weather the severe political and economic crisis. For 
example, they have the ability to generate internal funds and also have access to cheaper 
borrowings. However, in the context of Zimbabwe, they were more likely than smaller firms to be 
the target of political hostility and potentially to be accused of externalising foreign currency by the 
government. Gearing ratio can also be related to firm performance. As Short and Keasey (1999) 
contend, control over management actions is more effectively exercised by debt holders than 
shareholders. In Zimbabwe, banks play an important role of providing debt financing. Given the 
political and economic environment, banks are more likely to have strong incentives to monitor 
managers to ensure that they adhere to debt covenants and improve performance because poor 
8
 For example, shareholders, such as Nicholas van Hoogstraten, who controlled such firms as Wankie Colliery, were known to be 
connected to the Zanu PF government. Such connections may be used to (i) influence government policy decisions, (ii) ensure that the 
legal system do prosecute if managers expropriate, and (iii) secure scarce resources such as foreign currency and cheaper finance. 
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performing firms may be liquidated. In line with Durnev and Kim (2005), we include exports to 
control for differences in exposure to currency depreciation. Exporting firms may not be 
significantly affected by currency depreciation because they are able to use some of their export 
proceeds to pay for imported raw materials. Coles et al. (2008) suggest that the number of business 
segments can also influence performance. Firms operating in a number of sectors are likely to 
perform better due to the benefits of diversification. Finally, firms that are foreign controlled could 
benefit from parent support and be able to deal more effectively with the crisis. 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Data and Sample selection 
Our data are drawn from annual reports which were published during 2000 to 2005 by firms listed 
on the ZSE. We choose this period for three main reasons. First, the ZSE rewrote its listing rules in 
1998 and required firms to publish data on board and ownership structures, hence we can obtain the 
required data from the annual reports. Second, in November 1999, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Zimbabwe and the ZSE formally determined that Zimbabwe was a 
hyperinflationary economy and required all listed firms to publish inflation-adjusted financial 
statements in accordance with International Accounting Standard 29 (IAS 29): ‘Financial 
Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies’ (see Chamisa, 2007). 9 The requirement to publish IAS 
29 adjusted financial statements was effective for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 
2000. Consequently, the first inflation-adjusted financial statements were published in 2000.10 
Third, we are able to split the sample period into the pre- and post-presidential election periods 
(i.e., 2000-2002 and 2003-2005, respectively), thus allowing us to account for the worsening 
political and economic landscape in examining our hypotheses. 
9
 Zimbabwe adopts International Financial Reporting Standards (which subsume standards designated as IASs) as domestic 
standards, without modification, following a “due process” (Chamisa, 2000, p. 270) 
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 For the year 2000, only those firms with a 31 December year-end were required to publish restated financial statements, whilst 
firms with year-end during the year could publish inflation-adjusted financial statements voluntarily. However, in later years, all 
firms were required to comply with IAS 29. 
13 
As at 31 December 2005, 79 firms were listed on the ZSE and for each firm, we requested for 
annual reports for the period 2000 to 2005 (inclusive) from various sources (the listed firms, 
transfer secretaries, stockbrokers and the ZSE). This process yielded a total of 352 annual reports 
out of a possible 474 annual reports. We eliminated 54 reports published by banks and insurance 
firms in line with previous studies (e.g., Weir et al., 2002; Ho and Williams, 2003). Further, we 
also eliminated 41 annual reports which did not include inflation-adjusted accounts because in all 
our analyses we use inflation-adjusted data as reported in the annual reports. The inflation-adjusted 
accounts are compiled in compliance with IAS 29. In line with IAS 29, all the firms in the sample 
adjusted their historical cost accounts using the consumer price index (CPI) and published 
inflation-adjusted accounts as the primary financial statements (subject to audit opinion).11 This 
screening procedure resulted in 257 firm-years of panel data covering a total of 53 distinct firms. 
4.2 Measures of firm performance 
We develop two measures of performance using the inflation-adjusted data as discussed above: (1) 
Tobin’s Q (QRATIO) (a measure of market valuation), and (2) return on assets (ROA) (a measure 
of operating performance). Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Dahya et 
al., 2008; Bozec et al., 2010), we calculate the QRATIO as the market value of the firm at the year-
end, plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of total assets at the year-end as 
extracted from the annual reports. We measure ROA as profit before interest and tax for the year 
scaled to the total assets. Core et al. (2006) argue that ROA is a more powerful measure of 
operating performance than other accounting measures such as return on equity because it has more 
11
 IAS 29 requires financial statements reported in the currency of a hyperinflationary economy to be stated (by applying a general 
price index) in terms of the measuring unit current at the balance sheet date and corresponding figures for the previous period(s) to 
be restated in the same terms. The restatement procedure (per IAS 29) involves the following steps. Monetary items (i.e. money held 
or items to be received or paid in money) are not restated. However, non-monetary assets and liabilities (not measured at fair value), 
components of owners’ equity and all income statement items are restated. The gain or loss on the net monetary position is reported 
in the income statement. All the firms in our sample applied the CPI issued by the Zimbabwe Central Statistics Office to restate their 
financial statements. The basket of components making up the CPI did not change during the period covered by the study (see 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2005). Furthermore, the way in which the CPI was applied in adjusting the historical cost accounts for 
inflation was consistent and attested by auditors (over 90% of whom are the “big-four” international audit firms). 
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desirable distributional properties. For example, total assets are strictly positive, but equity can be 
zero or negative. 
4.3 Econometric estimation 
In most prior studies, the standard approach in examining the relationship between performance 
and corporate governance variables has been to employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) model. 
However, OLS models are problematic in the context of panel data because they treat data as cross-
sectional, thus ignoring the panel structure of the data (Roodman, 2009; Gujarati and Porter, 2009; 
Kohler and Kreuter, 2009). In this context, they violate the underlying OLS assumption that all 
observations are independent of each other. Accordingly, using Stata, we employ a system 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2009) 
which is widely used in empirical analyses involving panel data (Elsayed and Paton, 2005; Capezio 
et al., 2010). This approach is more appropriate because it removes the contamination through an 
identified finite-sample corrected set of equations that are robust to panel-specific autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity (Roodman, 2009; Capezio et al., 2010). It achieves this by using lagged 
differences and lagged levels of instrument dependent and independent variables (Elsayed and 
Paton, 2005; Roodman, 2009; Capezio et al., 2010). The following model is therefore specified: 
PERFORMANCEit = p1EXit + p2EWit + Vi + sit i=1,...,N; t=1,...,T (1) 
Where: 
PERFORMANCE is the dependent variable, which is measured using Tobin’s Q (QRATIO) or return 
on assets (ROA) as discussed in Sub-section 4.2 above. 
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EX is a vector of strictly exogenous covariates. In our case, these are year and industry dummies.12 
We consider these variables to be exogenous because they are not dependent on past or 
present error terms (Roodman, 2009). 
EW is a vector of endogenous covariates, and some of these are potentially correlated with past and 
present error terms. These variables include our main variables (board and ownership 
structures) and control variables (firm size, gearing, foreign control, business segments 
and exports) and are all defined in Table 1. 
V is the unobserved individual firm-level fixed effects. 
e is the observation specific error term that is assumed to be auto-correlated, with the added 
assumption that V and s are not serially correlated. 
01 and y&are vectors of the parameters to be estimated 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
For the descriptive analysis, we present in Table 2, the means for performance, board and 
ownership structures and control variables for the full period (2000-2005), for the pre-presidential 
election (2000-2002) and post-presidential election (2003-2005) periods and for each year. The 
mean QRATIO and ROA for the full study period 2000-2005 is 1.004 and 4.8% respectively. We 
observe that QRATIO and ROA increased from a mean of .957 and 3.3% in the pre-presidential 
election period to 1.043 and 6.2% in the post-presidential election period, respectively. The yearly 
data also show performance increased from .741 and 2.8% in 2000 to 1.146 and 6.9% in 2005 for 
QRATIO and ROA, respectively. These results suggest that even though the political and economic 
crisis worsened, firms improved their performance in the post-presidential election period. 
12
 We classified our sample into five industries based on ZSE industry classification as follows: (1) mining and construction; (2) 
agriculture; (3) retail and services; (4) manufacturing, and (5) diversified industries. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 also illustrates that on average the size of the board is approximately nine members, thus 
consistent with previous studies (e.g., Okeahalam, 2004; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). We 
observe an increase in the mean number of directors from about eight in the pre-presidential 
election period to about nine in the post-presidential election period. This increase seems to have 
occurred in 2003 and suggests that firms may have increased board sizes in the post-presidential 
election period perhaps to enhance their ability to deal with the worsening political and economic 
crisis. We however, observe a decrease in the proportion of non-executive directors from about 
73.3% in the pre-presidential election period to 69.8% in the post-presidential election period. This 
decrease seems to have started in 2003 suggesting that the increase in board size was due to an 
increase in executive directors rather than non-executive directors. It would seem that firms 
adopted a strategy of hiring more executive directors in the post-presidential election period to 
build up a strong team of executives, perhaps with expertise, to facilitate quicker and more 
effective decision-making processes. Finally, for ownership structure, the mean executive 
directors’ share ownership (for the full period) is 3.2%. Table 2 also indicates that executive 
directors’ share ownership increased from 1.6% in the pre-presidential election period to 4.6% in 
the post-presidential election period. We also observe that the mean ownership concentration 
increased from 40.8% to 45.5%. This increase is consistent with Roe’s (2003) argument that when 
faced with an unfriendly political and social environment, firms move towards greater ownership 
concentration as a means of coping with the threats from the environment. 
5.2 Multiple Regression Results 
We first present the univariate results in Table 3. As observed, both performance measures are 
significantly related to board size and proportion of non-executive directors, but not to executive 
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directors’ and concentrated share ownership. Although these univariate results show the relation 
between corporate board and ownership structures and performance, the analysis does not control 
for other factors of performance. We therefore extend our analysis to a multiple regression setting 
using the system GMM estimator. We first examine multicollinearity problems among the 
independent variables in our model. Table 3 shows that all the correlation coefficients are well 
below the threshold of 8 (see Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
5.2.1 Regressions results 
In Table 4, we report the system GMM estimates for both our performance measures based on 
robust standard errors. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
We start the analysis by attempting to replicate the results of previous studies (e.g., Yermack, 1996; 
Weir et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Dahya et al., 2008).13 The rationale for this analysis is 
to show the relationship between corporate boards and ownership structures in a stable operating 
environment. The results are reported under Model 1 for QRATIO and Model 3 for ROA. We find 
that board size is not significantly related to performance. These results are consistent with Ho and 
Williams (2003), but contradict other studies (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Dahya et al., 2008). We observe consistent with Yermack (1996) and Coles et al. (2008) that the 
coefficient of the proportion of non-executive directors is negative and significant at 1% level or 
better for both QRATIO and ROA. In terms of ownership structure variables, the coefficient of 
executive directors’ share ownership is positive and significant at the 1% and 5% level or better for 
QRATIO and ROA, respectively. These results are similar to Short and Keasey (1999). With 
13
 However, unlike these previous studies, which use an OLS model, we use a system GMM approach with robust 
standard errors. 
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respect to ownership concentration, the coefficient is negative for both QRATIO and ROA, but 
only significant at the 10% level or better for ROA. Finally, for the control variables, we find that 
firm size is negatively related to QRATIO consistent with Dahya et al. (2008) and Bozec et al. 
(2010), but positively related to ROA, in line with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). We also find that 
gearing is not significantly related to both QRATIO and ROA. Foreign control and business 
segments are not significant, but we observe a significant positive relationship between exports and 
performance at the 5% and 10% level or better for QRATIO and ROA, respectively. 
In the second analysis, we test our hypotheses of the relationship between performance and 
our board and ownership structure variables in an environment of severe political and economic 
crisis. To test the hypotheses, we introduce in our system GMM model, a dummy variable, Period, 
measured as 1 if post-presidential election period and 0 if pre-presidential election period. As we 
discussed earlier, Period captures the differences in the political and economic landscape. Similar 
to Coles et al. (2008), we also interact Period with the board and ownership structure variables 
(i.e., Board size*Period; Proportion of non-executive directors*Period; Executive directors’ share 
ownership*Period; Ownership concentration*Period). In our modelling (see Models 2 and 4, 
Table 4), the coefficients of Board size, Proportion of non-executive directors, Executive directors’ 
share ownership, and Ownership concentration capture the effects of these variables in the pre-
presidential election period (a stable political and economic period). These coefficients should not 
significantly differ from those in Models 1 and 3 for QRATIO and ROA, respectively. The 
coefficients of the interaction terms capture the incremental effects of the board and ownership 
structure variables in the post-presidential election period (a hostile political and economic period). 
The sum of the coefficients of the individual variable (e.g., Board size) and its interaction term (Board 
size*Period) reflects the total effect of the variable in the post-presidential election period. If board 
and ownership structures are important for performance in the post-presidential election period, we 
expect both the coefficients of the interaction terms and the sum of the coefficients of the individual 
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variables and their interaction terms to be positive and significant (see also Coles et al., 2008). We test 
the significance of the total effects using the Wald test (see bottom of Table 4 for the results). 
We report the results in columns labelled Model 2 and 4 of Table 4 for QRATIO and ROA, 
respectively. First, our results on the control variables remain similar to those reported in Models 1 
and 3. Second, for our main variables, we observe that the coefficient on board size is still positive, 
but not significant. However, we document that the coefficient of the interaction term (Board 
size*Period) is positive and significant at the 5% level or better. The total effects as measured by 
the sum of the coefficients of Board size and Board size*Period is positive and significant (see 
Wald tests at the bottom of Table 4), suggesting that performance increases with board size in the 
post-presidential election period. Therefore, our hypothesis 1 is supported. This finding is 
consistent with the political theory that when faced with increasing agency costs, firms may 
reshape their corporate structures to deal with the threats and improve performance (Roe, 2003). 
They are also in line with recent studies suggesting that firms with extensive advisory needs require 
larger boards and perform better as a result (e.g., Linck et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008). We 
suggest, from these results, that as the political and economic crisis deteriorated, the increase in 
board size brought a variety of knowledge, experience and linkages to support the CEO to deal 
effectively with the environment, and thus benefiting the firm. 
With respect to the effect of non-executive directors, the coefficient of the proportion of non-
executive directors is negative as Models 1 and 3, whilst the coefficient of the interaction term 
(Proportion on non-executive directors*Period) is positive for both the QRATIO and ROA 
models, but not statistically significant. The total effects are negative and significant. Hence 
hypothesis 2 is not supported--the proportion of non-executive directors does not benefit the firm in 
an environment of severe political and economic crisis. These results challenge the conventional 
wisdom that more non-executive directors buttress the board’s monitoring role. A possible 
explanation for these findings is that firms might have reduced monitoring and ceded more 
discretion to executive directors (Burkart et al., 1999; Coles et al., 2008). The reduction in the 
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proportion of non-executive directors in the post-presidential election period seems to support this 
view (see Table 2). As Mitroff et al. (1988) and Pearson and Clair (1998) suggest, ceding decisions 
to a team of executives is a critical strategy in successfully managing the firm in a crisis 
environment. 
For ownership variables, we find that the coefficient for executive directors’ share ownership 
is positive and significant as in Models 1 and 3, suggesting that share ownership by executive 
directors benefits the firm in a stable operating environment. However, for both QRATIO and 
ROA, the interaction term, executive directors’ share ownership*Period, is negative and 
significant at the 5% level or better. Thus hypothesis 3 is supported. Nonetheless, the total effect of 
executive directors’ share ownership is not significant, suggesting that the overall effect of 
executive directors’ share ownership is neutral. Finally, the coefficient of ownership concentration 
is not significant, but the interaction term (Ownership concentration*Period) is positive and 
significant at the 5% level or better, for both the QRATIO and ROA models. The total effects of 
ownership concentration on performance are positive and significant, thus supporting our 
hypothesis 4. These results are consistent with the argument that when the political pressures are 
severe (Roe, 2003) and/or the legal systems are weak (La Porta et al., 1998), ownership 
concentration might be an efficient monitoring mechanism. 
5.2.2 Further analyses 
To enhance the robustness of our results, we perform further analyses on the relationship between 
our corporate board and ownership structures and firm performance. These additional analyses 
suggest that our proposition that certain corporate governance structures are important in an 
environment of severe political and economic crisis is still being supported. First, in the context of 
the results in Table 4, we run separate system GMM regressions for the pre- (2000-2002) and post-
(2003-2005) presidential election periods. To the extent that board size and concentrated ownership 
are more important in complex or severe crisis environments, we expect these variables to be more 
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associated with QRATIO and ROA in the period 2003-2005 than in the 2000-2002. The results are 
reported in Table 5. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Our results show that for the period 2000-2002, board size and concentrated ownership are not 
significantly associated with QRATIO and ROA. The proportion of non-executive directors is 
negative and significant whilst executive directors’ share ownership is positive and significant. In 
the period 2003-2005, both QRATIO and ROA are positively related to board size and negatively 
related to the proportion of non-executive directors at the 5% level or better. We find that 
performance is negatively related to directors’ share ownership at the 5% level or better, but 
positively related to ownership concentration at the 5% level or better. Overall, the results support 
those we reported in Table 4. 
Second, following Roodman (2009), we conducted the Hansen test and Arellano-Bond 
second order autocorrelation test (AR2) to assess the reliability of our estimates as well as to ensure 
that our results do not derive from methodological problems. The Hansen test allows the testing of 
the null hypothesis that instruments are not correlated with the error term, and thus tests the validity 
of instruments. The AR2 tests the null hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation in 
the disturbance term (Roodman, 2009). If the two hypotheses are not rejected, then it implies that 
the system GMM approach is an appropriate model for our analysis. We find that for all the models 
(see bottom of Table 4 for the tests results), the Hansen test results are not significant, indicating 
that the instruments are valid and are not correlated with the error term. The Arellano-Bond (AR1) 
tests are all statistically significant suggesting that the levels used to instrument the first-
differenced equation provide weak instruments. We fail to reject the AR2 tests, thus providing 
evidence that the error terms in the system of equations are not serially correlated and orthogonality 
has been achieved (Roodman, 2009). These tests indicate that the system GMM approach is valid. 
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Finally, we use alternative measures for firm size. Larcker et al. (2007) suggests that large 
firms are more likely to have larger boards than smaller firms (Larcker et al., 2007). We therefore 
dichotomised firm size at the median of total assets. Firms with total assets below the median are 
classified as small, whereas those with total assets at and above median are considered large firms. 
We replicate the regressions by replacing the log of total assets with dummy variables, assuming 1 
if large (at and above median) and 0 if small (below median). We also re-run the regressions using 
the log of total sales as a measure of firm size (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In both cases, our 
results remain largely similar to those in Tables 4 and 5. 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we use the system GMM approach to examine the relationship between board and 
ownership structures and firm performance in an environment of severe political and economic 
crisis, and where the legal systems are dysfunctional. We draw from the political theory (Roe, 
2003) to examine the issue. Using data drawn from the ZSE for the period 2000-2005 inclusive, we 
split the study period into pre-presidential election period (2000-2002) (a relatively stable political 
and economic environment) and post-presidential election period (2003-2005) (a hostile political 
and economic environment) to capture the differences in the political and economic landscape. We 
find that in the post-presidential election period, the size of boards, executive directors’ share 
ownership and ownership concentration increased, whilst the proportion of non-executive directors 
reduced. Firm performance (Tobin’s Q and return on assets) is positively related to board size and 
ownership concentration in the post-presidential election period, but not in the pre-presidential 
election period. We document that the relationship between performance and executive directors’ 
share ownership is positive in the pre-presidential election period, but negative in the post-
presidential election period. The relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and 
performance is negative irrespective of the period. Overall, our results suggest that large boards 
and ownership concentration are more important in an environment of severe political and 
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economic crisis. These findings are interesting and support the literature suggesting that the effects 
of corporate board and ownership structures on performance depend upon the environment of the 
firm (see La Porta et al., 1998; Roe, 2003; Coles et al., 2008). 
In interpreting the results, however, some limitations need to be noted. First, we only 
examined a limited number of corporate governance variables. Other board structures such as the 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees and board meetings may also be associated with 
firm performance. Second, political connections can be a valuable resource (Claessens et al., 2008) 
in an environment of political and economic crisis and therefore can also influence firm 
performance. However, given the limited data, these variables could not be included in the 
analyses. 
In spite of the limitations, taken overall, these results have implications for both local and 
international investors. They are also relevant to policy-makers and firms in African countries (and 
other developing countries), as they attempt to improve corporate governance. The results suggest 
that corporate governance regulations need to consider the nature of the environment rather than 
adopting a one-size-fit all approach to corporate governance (Coles et al., 2008). Future research 
could employ firms drawn from a number of African stock exchanges and examine different 
organisational outcomes such as disclosure and earnings management. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables included in the regression models 
Variable Definition 
Performance Measures 
QRATIO 
ROA 
Firm performance (Tobin’s Q), measured as the market value of the firm, 
plus the book value of liabilities at the financial year end divided by the 
book value of total assets at the end of the financial year. 
Firm performance (Return on assets), measured as profit before interest and 
tax for the year scaled to the total assets at the end of the financial year. 
Corporate Board Structure Variables 
Board size 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
Total number of board members at the beginning of the financial year, 
extracted from previous year’s annual report. 
Board composition, measured as the number of non-executive directors at 
the beginning of the financial year scaled by total board members at that 
date extracted from previous year’s annual report. We do not distinguish 
between affiliated and independent non-executive directors because the 
information is not available. 
Ownership Structure Variables 
Executive directors’ share 
ownership 
Ownership concentration 
Executive directors’ shareholding, measured as the number of equity shares 
held by all executive directors, including non-beneficial shareholding held 
scaled by total number of equity shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
financial year, extracted from previous year’s annual report. 
Concentrated share ownership, measured as the number of equity shares 
held by non-institutional shareholders (individual or other firms) with 
shareholding of 10% or more (Dahya et a., 2008) scaled by total number of 
equity shares outstanding at the beginning of the financial year, extracted 
from previous year’s annual report. We exclude institutional investors 
because they are not actively involved in corporate governance (see World 
Bank, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). 
Control Variables 
Assets 
Gearing 
Exports 
Business segments 
Foreign control 
Firm size, measured as the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the 
financial year extracted from the previous year’s annual reports. 
Gearing ratio, measured as total debt at the beginning of the financial year 
scaled by total assets at that date, extracted from the previous year’s annual 
reports. 
Exports, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports 
export sales in the financial statements, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable, scored 1 if firm has two or more business segments, 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable, scored 1 if more than 50% of the shares are held by 
foreigners and, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (means) for dependent and independent variables 
Variables 
Performance measures 
Tobin’s Q (QRATIO) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Board and ownership structures 
Board size 
Proportion of non-executive directors 
Executive directors’ share ownership 
Ownership concentration 
Control variables 
Assets 
Gearing 
Business segments 
Firm-year observations 
Full Period 
(2000-2005 
1.004 
.048 
8.685 
.714 
.032 
.422 
328,662 
.427 
2.093 
257 
Pre-presidential 
election period 
(2000-2002) 
.957 
.033 
7.957 
.733 
.016 
.408 
10,349 
.430 
2.059 
113 
Post-presidential 
election period 
(2003-2005) 
1.043 
.062 
9.302 
.698 
.046 
.455 
598,886 
.424 
2.122 
144 
2000 
.741 
.028 
7.737 
.733 
.025 
.396 
10,264 
.435 
2.031 
30 
2001 
.951 
.043 
7.658 
.734 
.013 
.415 
5,292 
.447 
2.146 
38 
2002 
1.105 
.060 
8.234 
.733 
.023 
.407 
11,439 
.413 
2.000 
45 
2003 
1.203 
.119 
9.109 
.718 
.023 
.430 
83,638 
.412 
2.065 
48 
2004 
.784 
.031 
9.311 
.704 
.056 
.429 
261,830 
.432 
2.111 
49 
2005 
1.146 
.069 
9.543 
.674 
.048 
.435 
1,472,900 
.429 
2.196 
47 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
Variables 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Tobin’s Q (QRATIO) 
Return on assets (ROA) 
Board size 
Proportion of non-executive directors 
Executive Directors’ share ownership 
Ownership Concentration 
Foreign control 
Business Segments 
Exports 
Assets 
Gearing 
1. 
1.000 
299*** 
.166** 
-.108* 
-.033 
.069 
-.083 
.038 
-.047 
-.055 
.060 
2. 
1.000 
.133** 
-.135** 
.009 
-.017 
-.016 
.092 
.094 
.044 
-.133 
3. 
1.000 
.108* 
-.091 
-.043 
-.085 
-.136 
.195*** 
.189*** 
-.153** 
4. 
1.000 
.008 
-.123** 
-.023 
-.077 
.219*** 
-.081 
-.146** 
5. 
1.000 
-.015 
-.034 
.176*** 
-.007 
.002 
-.074 
6. 
1.000 
.088 
-.190*** 
-.066 
.049 
-.067 
7. 
1.000 
-.168*** 
.036 
.027 
-.082 
8. 
1.000 
.118* 
-.034 
.208*** 
9. 
1.000 
.0189 
.009 
10. 
1.000 
-.020 
11. 
1.000 
***. Significant at 1% level 
**. Significant at 5% level 
*. Significant at 10% level 
1 
Table 4: System GMM results for the relation between board and ownership structures and QRATIO 
and ROA 
Corporate board structure variables 
Board size 
Board size*Period 
Proportion of non-executive directors 
Proportion of non-executive directors*Period 
Ownership structure variables 
Executive directors’ share ownership 
Executive directors’ share ownership*Period 
Ownership concentration 
Ownership concentration*Period 
Control variables 
Log assets 
Gearing 
Foreign control 
Business segments 
Exports 
Period 
Year dummies 
Industry dummies 
Constant 
Observations 
Hansen test of over-identification 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 
Total effects of board and ownership 
structures (F-test using Wald test) 
Board size 
Proportion of non-executive directors 
Executive directors’ share ownership 
Ownership concentration 
QRATIO Model 
Model 1 
.0644 
(.0509) 
-
-.5166*** 
(.1147) 
-
.5801*** 
(.1290) 
-
-.2135 
(.2309) 
-
-.3509*** 
(.0521) 
.0252 
(.2372) 
-.0003 
(.0107) 
.0603 
(.0521) 
.0736** 
(.03271) 
-
Included 
Included 
-4.0553 
(.8263) 
257 
38.3800 
-2.6500*** 
-1.2500 
Model 2 
.0194 
(.0286) 
.0987*** 
(.0348) 
-1.3577** 
(.6790) 
.7819 
(.6007) 
1.9231** 
(.8969) 
-1.9126** 
(.8771) 
-.1122 
(.2566) 
.6946** 
(.2983) 
-.2037** 
(.0819) 
-.0613 
(.3463) 
-.0024 
(.0130) 
.0353 
(.0339) 
.0954** 
(.0397) 
.1322 
(.7249) 
Included 
Included 
2.7811** 
(1.2326) 
257 
37.2400 
-2.5200*** 
-1.5800 
.1181*** 
-.5758** 
.0105 
.5824** 
ROA Model 
Model 3 
.0742 
(.0461) 
-
-.6761*** 
(.2181) 
-
.1991** 
(.1167) 
-
-.1758* 
(.1007) 
-
.0228** 
(.0111) 
.0140 
(.0235) 
.0014 
(.0046) 
.0164 
(.0115) 
.0742* 
(.0451) 
-
Included 
Included 
-.0626 
(.3594) 
257 
42.9000 
-3.3600*** 
-1.6600 
Model 4 
.0078 
(.0129) 
.0244** 
(.0115) 
-.8788*** 
(.2493) 
.1019 
(.2605) 
.8771** 
(.4339) 
-.8578** 
(.4282) 
-.1646 
(.1258) 
.2403** 
(.1057) 
.0490*** 
(.0114) 
-.0299 
(.0272) 
-.0005 
(.00051) 
.0114 
(.0132) 
.0973* 
(.0535) 
-.4169 
(.2450) 
Included 
Included 
-.03967 
(.3519) 
257 
41.59000 
-3.3600** 
-1.2600 
.0322** 
-.7769*** 
.0193 
.0757** 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
***. Significant at 1% level; **. Significant at 5% level; *. Significant at 10% level 
2 
Table 5: System GMM results for the relation between board and ownership structures and QRATIO 
and ROA: Pre- and Post- presidential election periods 
QRATIO Model ROA Model 
Corporate board structure variables 
Board size 
Proportion of non-executive directors 
Ownership structure variables 
Executive directors’ share ownership 
Ownership concentration 
Control variables 
Log total assets 
Gearing 
Foreign control 
Business segments 
Exports 
Year dummies 
Industry dummies 
Constant 
Observations 
Pre-presidential 
election period 
(2000-2) 
-.0821 
(.0604) 
-1.7092** 
(.8796) 
.6535*** 
(.2385) 
.4956 
(.5523) 
-.0602 
(.0863) 
-.4427** 
(.1273) 
.0999 
(.1144) 
.0797 
(.2366) 
.2481** 
(.1116) 
Included 
Included 
-.1579 
(.7725) 
113 
Post-presidential 
election period 
(2003-5) 
.1369** 
(.0671) 
-.5496** 
(.2919) 
-.5653*** 
(.1941) 
1.4626** 
(.7859) 
-.1028** 
(.0448) 
-.4212** 
(.1094) 
-.0267 
(.0532) 
.0342 
(.1295) 
.5022** 
(.2279) 
Included 
Included 
.1239 
(1.2609) 
144 
Pre-presidential 
election period 
(2000-2) 
.0032 
(.0156) 
-.5451** 
(.2313) 
+.0730** 
(.0320) 
-.1729 
(.1490) 
.0247 
(.0232) 
-.3663*** 
(.1518) 
.0985 
(.2658) 
.0296 
(.0556) 
.0661* 
(.0340) 
Included 
Included 
-.3569 
(.2223) 
113 
Post-presidential 
election period 
(2003-5) 
.2176** 
(.0911) 
-.4813** 
(.2337) 
-.3355** 
(.1509) 
.2017** 
(.0996) 
.0487** 
(.0191) 
-.6828*** 
(.1634) 
.0779 
(.0706) 
.1041 
(.2635) 
.2031** 
(.0822) 
Included 
Included 
-1.0884** 
(.4393) 
144 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
***. Significant at 1% level; **. Significant at 5% level; *. Significant at 10% level 
3 
